Noah has asked for a more thorough explanation of what Group Purchasing Organizations are and how they affect the healthcare debate. Since he is currently my only reader, I shall oblige him.
Group Purchasing Organizations, or GPOs, leverage the increased purchasing power of a group of purchasers to obtain lower prices from suppliers. In theory, the GPOs obtain the lowest possible prices by bargaining aggressively with vendors, who lower their prices in order to access the big chunks of the market that the various GPOs represent. Since pricing outside of a GPO agreement is (again, in theory) always higher, there is a big incentive for hospitals to do the bulk of their business through a group buy contract. In the U.S., this means that the majority of hospital purchasing, from consumables to capital equipment, is handled through GPO contract pricing.
A bit of history: the first healthcare GPO was founded in 1910 by the Hospital Bureau of New York as a response to price-gouging on the part of suppliers in the Manhattan area. Hospitals in the same city realized that they were paying wildly different prices for consumables like bandages and bed linens. The Hospital Bureau organization allowed them to get together and bargain collectively with their vendors to obtain better pricing; in exchange, the most aggressively priced vendors would be able to move greater volume by selling to all area hospitals at once.
The advent of Medicare (and, to a lesser extent, Medicaid) in the late 60s fostered a boom in healthcare GPOs. Suddenly, elderly people of all income levels represented a guaranteed stream of income from the federal government to the healthcare industry. Medicare reimbursement rates were (and always have been) low compared to market rates, but the reliability of those payments compared to cash or the fledgling private insurance business led to Medicare becoming one of the most important pillars of the hospital community (more on the importance of Medicare to hospitals later, for now, we focus on GPOs). Flush with cash, the medical device and consumable markets, and with them, the GPO industry, boomed.
One problem with GPOs was traditionally their sources of funding. The slew of GPO startups in the 70s and early 80s focused on not charging fees to hospitals for their services, instead, (and this is the important part)
they took from their contracted vendors a percentage of sales to cover their costs. The more money a vendor made, the more money the GPO made, essentially incentivizing GPOs to find the
highest price that they could get away with and still be able to claim "savings". If this seems counterintuitive to you, you're not alone. The problem was exacerbated by the emergence of the first Integrated Delivery Networks (IDNs), parent corporations that owned both the hospitals and the GPOs that supplied them, which found they could take a slice of the money leaving the hospital (in the form of payments for supplies and equipment) by simply setting up the GPO as a required middleman between vendors and hospitals.
In 1986,
Congress granted the first of several "safe harbor" exemptions for GPOs from federal healthcare-related anti-kickback laws that threatened to undo an industry that had relied on what were, for all intents and purposes, direct payments from vendors in exchange for access to a hospital's business. Healthcare Group Purchasing Organizations now had legal cover to operate in a way that would get any other kind of healthcare entity in hot water with the Feds. The justification at the time was that GPOs were so integral in reigning in the cost of healthcare (proved by a series of GPO-sponsored studies) that they deserved a special exemption that allowed them to continue to operate as they had been.
In a coming post, I will explain how the current state of the GPO field is making healthcare more costly, the studies both by both private and public institutions that point this out, and the enormous political power GPOs and IDNs wield to defend themselves and their business practices from reform.